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WRONGFUL LIFE TORT AND JOHN PAUL II
GRAHAM J. MCALEERt
Three state judiciaries in America-California, New Jersey,
and Washington-agree that a child can sue a doctor on the
grounds that the doctor harmed the child by failing to abort him.'
State jurists argue that the child was harmed because it would
be better to have never been born than to live life with a
disability. 2  By failing to facilitate the abortion, the doctor
unjustifiably takes from the child the preferred state of
nonexistence when the alternative is a suffering existence.
Taking away the good of non-being in such circumstances is the
foundation for a wrongful life tort. The tort is controversial; at
least eighteen American states have legislated against the tort.3
It is crucial to appreciate that a wrongful life tort does not rely on
the premise that the doctor is responsible for the disability. This
is not the harm. The disabilities involved, such as genetic
deafness, 4 are not in the power of the doctor to change. What is
in the doctor's power, however, is nonexistence rather than
existence. 5 Put differently, as one commentator describes it, the
tort includes abortion in its definition.6 It is also important to
t Professor of Philosophy, Loyola College in Maryland; D.Phil, Katholieke
Universiteit, Leuven, Belgium; M.A., Katholieke Universiteit, Leuven, Belgium;
M.A., University of Alberta, Canada; B.A., University College, London University,
England. I would like to thank Catherine McCauliff of Seton Hall Law School who
kindly read and gave suggestions on how to improve the paper.
1 See Kimberly D. Wilcoxon, Statutory Remedies for Judicial Torts: The Need for
Wrongful Birth Legislation, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1023 n.1 (2001) (noting only
California, Washington, and New Jersey recognize a wrongful life cause of action).
2 See Kristin Hackett, The Fragile X Omen: Scientific Advances Compel a
Legislative Treatment of Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth, 2 J.L. & TECH 249, 252
(1987); see also Wilcoxon, supra note 1, at 1037.
3 See Bader v. Johnson, 675 N.E.2d 1119, 1123 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
4 See Hackett, supra note 2, at 262.
5 To have a case, a child is "required to say not that he should have been born
without defects but that he should not have been born at all." Jennifer R. Granchi,
The Wrongful Birth Tort: A Policy Analysis and the Right To Sue for an Inconvenient
Child, 43 S. TEX. L. REv. 1261, 1268 (2002) (quoting Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d
689, 692 (N.J. 1967)).
6 See Wilcoxon, supra note 1, at 1035.
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distinguish a wrongful life tort from a wrongful birth tort.
Wrongful birth purports a harm for which a doctor can be liable if
he or she somehow removes a woman's choice of an abortion as a
solution to her child's disability. 7 In this tort the harm is the
denial of a choice to abort; in a wrongful life tort the harm is the
failure to abort.
Like many legislatures, most courts in America doubt that
any coherence attaches to the basic ontological claim underlying
the tort: How can life be an injury?8 One court spoke for many
when noting, "[t]he moral implications of allowing the child's
claim are philosophically staggering."9 Indeed. At least since the
time of Plotinus, 10 the idea that non-being is a good has made no
metaphysical sense." Plotinus argued that privation of being is
evil.12  Augustine famously made this argument a part of
Christianity;13 thus, Aquinas can argue "the good that all things
desire is being."14 Plotinus' position, however, is by no means
self-evident to humanitarianism. Humanitarianism is an ethic
that views suffering as the very meaning of evil, 15 and if a
person's existence is one of "terrible pain," this well warrants the
consideration of killing such a person.16 If having being is
necessary for suffering, then non-being can be a solution: a
solution the doctor ought to have pursued, according to the tort
and with the full support of humanitarian ethics.
In this article, I show that whilst humanitarianism makes
the tort intelligible, the tort's appeal rests on its formality of
suicide. Strangely, Catholic moral theology agrees that the tort
is intelligible. Although the tort is coherent, papal moral
theology must deny the tort is just. John Paul II's Evangelium
7 Id. at 1027.
8 See Granchi, supra note 5, at 1266 (quoting Azollino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d
528, 534 (N.C. 1985)) (discussing the "untraditional analysis" of whether "the
existence of human life can constitute an injury cognizable at law").
9 Schloss v. Miriam Hosp., No. C.A. 98-2076, 1999 WL 41875, at *5 (R.I. Jan. 11,
1999).
10 The time of Plotinus was 204-70 C.E.
11 Earlier, Aristotle speculated that the nothingness after death made death the
"most frightening" phenomenon. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. III, 1115a25-30.
12 PLOTINUS, THE ENNEADS 58 (Stephen MacKenna trans., Penguin Books
1991) (1917).
13 AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS, bk. VII, § 12, at 148 (1975).
14 Thomas, Sent. IV, d. 49, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1.
15 See PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 203-04 (2d ed. 1990) (equating man's
dominion over animals with tyranny, based on an animal's ability to suffer).
16 Id. at 20.
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Vitae reasserted Aquinas' philosophy of law respecting homicide.
In it, suicide is again condemned by the Church. Aquinas argued
that suicide could only be justified if God's sovereignty was
replaced by human sovereignty. 17 Humanitarian ethics has just
such an aim, and so, amongst Aquinas' five arguments against
suicide, this one is typically thought the weakest. Recently, John
Paul the Great strongly re-affirmed this argument in his claim
that the culture of death can be traced to the eclipse of God.' 8 In
the following pages, I defend the argument of Evangelium Vitae,
in particular paragraph twenty, in which John Paul II argues
that contemporary liberal democracy is "a form of
totalitarianism," which is regarded as the most outrageous claim
of the encyclical. I argue that John Paul II is correct that
humanitarian love is totalitarian.
Peter Singer's humanitarian ethics is a good illustration of
this papal claim. The finest Catholic analyst of totalitarianism,
Aurel Kolnai, identified what he referred to as identitarian, or
equalitarian, logic as the animating principle of totalitarianism.
Intrinsicalism establishes a moral hierarchy which discriminates
amongst human needs. This limit to human sovereignty is
rejected by humanitarian ethics, and this is completely
unsurprising. "Acknowledging the Lord as God is the very core,
the heart of the Law,"'19 and some of the precepts of the Law, as
John Paul II argues, describe and forbid intrinsically evil acts.
These precepts, I argue, are eccentric. They defend the stranger
and eccentric from totality, from the urge within humanitarian
love to identity and equality. They are a shield for the disabled
against the humanitarian love that offers homicide as a solution
to their suffering and the suffering of caregivers.
Humanitarianism is perhaps the dominant mode of
valuation in the modern Western world. Certainly, Nietzsche
thought this. People in the West are thoroughly familiar with
ideas of humanitarian relief, humanitarian intervention, and
humanitarian organizations like Doctors Without Borders. They
are also very familiar with individual humanitarians like U2's
17 Swiss NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON BIOMEDICAL ETHICS,
Op. No. 9/2005, ASSISTED SUICIDE 15 (2005), available at
http://www.nek-cne.ch/enlpdf/suizid-en.pdf#search=aquinas%20suicide%20sovereign
ty.
18 JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LEITER EVANGELIUM VITAE 21-24 (1995).
19 JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER VERITATIS SPLENDOR 11 (1993).
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Bono, who was one of Time's Persons of the Year in 2005.20 For
his work in trying to secure debt relief for developing nations,
Bono was dubbed a "Good Samaritan"21 by the magazine-this in
the year that John Paul II died. In addition, Nietzsche was
probably the first person to identify the phenomenon of
humanitarianism. His savage criticism of the phenomenon has
marked Western thought and life ever since.22 This criticism
certainly found favour with Scheler and with the later
generations of the Munich school of phenomenology, Kolnai and
Wojtyla. 23  Nietzsche linked humanitarianism to a certain
English sensibility that he saw most clearly exhibited by
utilitarian thinkers like Bentham. 24 Suffering, Bentham argued,
must guide all morals and law. 25 It is no surprise that Bentham
was one of the first theorists of vegetarianism, and Singer has
argued that it is immoral to eat fish because the pleasures of
fishing and eating what you catch could not possibly outweigh
the suffering of the fish. This argument makes sense to
humanitarians, and even a hard-nosed rationalist like Peter
Singer mentions it without any embarrassment at all.26 Clearly,
humanitarian ethics can make ready sense of wrongful life tort!
Courts have found persuasive the idea that a child's future
20 Persons of the Year: The Good Samaritans, TIME, Dec. 26, 2005, at 38.
21 Id.
22 The most self-conscious humanitarians are alive to the problem Nietzsche
poses, but are equally quick to state for the record (yet again) what a boon the man
was for Nazi ideology. See, e.g., JONATHTAN GLOVER, HUMANITY: A MORAL HISTORY
OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 11 (Yale Univ. Press 2000) (1999) (acknowledging the
important questions Nietzche raised concerning the foundations of moral thought,
but emphasizing that "his ideas were congenial to the Nazis").
23 Neither Kolnai nor Wojtyla makes a great deal of use of the ressentiment
analysis that was so central to Scheler's ethics, but they do agree about the problem
humanitarianism poses. Wojtyla uses a ressentiment analysis when discussing
chastity in LOVE AND RESPONSIBILITY, 143-47 (H.T. Willetts trans., Farrar, Straus
& Giroux 1981) (1960). I know of no other places where he does so. There are a few
references to ressentiment in Kolnai's writings. He seemingly thought it a useful tool
to capture some particular moral phenomena, but denied it the global explanatory
power found in Nietzsche and Scheler.
24 On the close alliance between utilitarianism and humanitarianism, see
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY 5 (Keith Ansell-Pearson
ed., Carol Diethe trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1887), and MAX SCHELER,
RESSENTIMENT 107 (Andrew Tallon ed., Lewis B. Coser & William W. Holdheim
trans., Marquette Univ. Press 1994) (1912).
25 SINGER, supra note 15, at 7-8.
26 Id. at 171-72.
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suffering well warrants abortion. 27 This would just be a matter
of satisfying Singer's compact definition, "humanitarianism, the
tendency to act humanely."28
The Munich school early on observed the close alliance
between humanitarianism and utilitarianism.29  As is well
known, utilitarianism has a strong voice in public policy
discussions in the Western world, and wrongful life tort is no
exception. Philosophical defenses of wrongful life tort tend to be
variants of utilitarianism. The hope of these studies is to provide
a theoretical framework to guide judges. A sticking point for the
courts, however, has been the question of whether it could
possibly be better for a child never to have existed.30 A typical
response runs as follows: A child's anguished existence is a
negative well-being whilst non-existence is a matter of zero well-
being. A harm can thus be measured; the child has a lesser
degree of well-being now than if the child had never existed at
all.3 ' A certain elegance attaches to this proposal, but note what
is missing: omitted is that the alternatives are not between now
existing and never having existed. Rather, the alternative is:
better to have been aborted than to have an anguished existence.
Is it better to have been aborted-to have an aborted status,
more, to suffer dismemberment or bodily dissolution-than to
have been born? The proposal really needs to be cast in terms of
the true alternative states. It is surely far from clear that non-
existence on account of an aborted status is a matter of zero well-
being and not rather a negative well-being. It is little surprise,
given the abstract character of utilitarianism, that the reality of
27 Wilcoxon, supra note 1, at 1039.
28 SINGER, supra note 15, at 198.
29 See WOJTYLA, supra note 23, at 34-39 (describing utilitarianism and its goal
of maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain); see also SCHELER, supra note 24, at
107 (noting the amalgamation of humanitarian love, utilitarianism, and Christian
morality); Aurel Kolnai, The Humanitarian Versus the Religious Attitude, 7
THOMIST 429, 435, 441-42 (1944) (discussing humanitarianism as a moral theory
rooted in utilitarian needs).
30 See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978) ('Whether it is better never to have been born at all than to
have been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be left to
the philosophers and the theologians."); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692
(N.J. 1967) (stating that it is impossible to determine the difference between a life
with defects and "the utter void of non-existence").
31 See Melinda A. Roberts, Can It Ever Be Better Never To Have Existed at All?
Person.Based Consequentialism and a New Repugnant Conclusion, 20 J. APPLIED
PHIL. 159, 168 (2003) (explaining the calculation of negative existence).
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the alternatives is elided. Yet, this is a critical distinction: for
our intuitions are by no means so clear once we begin to wonder
whether it is better for the child before us to have been
dismembered than to exist even with severe disabilities.
To clarify concepts and isolate the implications of arguments
is often thought the task of philosophy. But disputing the
cogency of arguments offered for wrongful life tort is not yet to
get at the heart of the issue. Philosophy is also concerned with
strands of ideas-large shifts in the ways people think about the
person and the world. Addressed at this level, wrongful life tort
poses a special problem for Catholic thinking about homicide.
More than sixty years ago, Kolnai observed the peculiar
conceptual threat humanitarianism posed to Catholic
moral theology. Catholic ethics, he noted, is "universalistic,
personalistic and moralistic" and, to a significant degree,
rationalistic. 32 It is very like humanitarian ethics, he observed,
and even though humanitarianism is "a non-religious,
immanentistic, secular moral orientation,"33 Catholic ethics does
agree that "God is, generally speaking, not the thematic center of
natural morality. '34 It is unsurprising, then, but still disturbing,
that sometimes moral theologians share the intuitions of
humanitarians. M. Cathleen Kaveny, without endorsing the
practice, goes to great lengths to explain the plausibility of
mothers choosing to kill their unborn children rather than give
them up for adoption. 35 Noting how rare it is that a woman gives
birth and puts her child up for adoption-at least in the West
and where a contract for money has not been entered into-
Kaveny explains that there clearly are women "who find
separation worse than death."3 6 These women believe that their
32 Kolnai, supra note 29, at 434.
33 Id. at 429.
34 Id. at 442. Compare the near identical accounts of intrinsic evils in
FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, COMMENTARY ON SUMMA THEOLOGIAE IIa-IIae Q. 64
(THOMAS AQUINAS) (1934), reprinted in REFLECTION ON HOMICIDE & COMMENTARY
ON SUMMA THEOLOGIAE II-IIae Q. 64 (THOMAS AQUINAS) 141 (John P. Doyle trans.,
Marquette Univ. Press 1997) and IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 119-20
(Louis Infield trans., Peter Smith 1978) (1930). Also see Kolnai, supra note 29, at
429, 434, 442.
35 See M. Cathleen Kaveny, Conjoined Twins and Catholic Moral Analysis:
Extraordinary Means and Casuistical Consistency, 12 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 115,
121-24 (2002) (describing reasons why some women would choose to terminate a
pregnancy over relinquishing a child after birth).
36 Id. at 126.
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family obligation to their children cannot be severed by the
positive legal enactment of adoption, but can be "completely
extinguished only by death."37  Apparently, this tells us
something about "maternal instinct" and "the underlying
realities of the relationships at stake"38 and indicates that a
"laudatory" motive might be found for abortion: "A parent may
not wish the death of the child per se, but may privilege familial
loyalty in a way that makes abandonment a fate worse than
death."39
The underlying assumption here is that suffering is a worse
evil than killing an innocent person. Humanitarianism affirms
this assumption, but moral theology cannot. Christians do not
think that suffering is a moral evil, whilst for Singer, suffering is
the horizon for all ethical reflection-the norm of ethics is to
reduce suffering.40  Traditional Catholic moral theology dis-
tinguishes an intrinsic evil, such as killing the innocent, from the
evil of suffering, which somehow, however mysteriously revealed
through the Cross, shows "that the meaning of life is fully
realized in and through suffering."41 Humanitarianism, however,
does not identify two different kinds of evil. Rather, these
evils are part of a sliding scale that allows comparison.
Humanitarianism precludes identifying the qualitative difference
between these evils because it cannot tolerate the restraint
placed upon human judgment by the idea of intrinsic evil. 42
Humanitarianism is a bold assertion of human sovereignty
that necessarily abolishes the sovereignty of the moral object, and
therewith God's sovereignty. With the sovereignty of the object
37 Id. at 124.
38 Id. at 126-27.
39 Id. at 123.
40 See PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 181-82 (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter
SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS] (highlighting the conflict between protecting life and
the ethical goal of reducing suffering in the decision to kill a seriously disabled
infant).
41 CHARLES JOURNET, THE MEANING OF EVIL 236 (Michael Barry trans., 1963);
see MATTHEW WEBB LEVERING, CHRIST'S FULFILLMENT OF TORAH AND TEMPLE:
SALVATION ACCORDING TO THOMAS AQUINAS 57 (2002) (noting that humans must
suffer "[t]o restore the soul to justice").
42 See Kolnai, supra note 29, at 444 (stating that "irreligious humanitarianism
necessarily involves a certain bias for immoralism inasmuch as it has no room for
the concept of intrinsic moral evil"); cf. PETER SINGER, THE EXPANDING CIRCLE:
ETHICS AND SOCIOBIOLOGY 152-53 (1981) [hereinafter SINGER, EXPANDING CIRCLE]
(discussing the importance of individual human judgment in humanitarian ethics).
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abolished, 43 a calculation amongst human needs is all that is left.
This means, as Kolnai puts it, "[aill kinds of 'needs' and the
'needs' of all men and groups of men are equally legitimate in
principle; any preconceived bias or restriction is illegitimate."44
Humanitarianism recognizes an equality of needs. The "need" of
a child to have been aborted to avoid suffering (wrongful life tort)
is no less a need than a myriad of other needs to increase
pleasure and avoid suffering (a mother's need for an abortion
because of the pressure of life circumstances) and one that, like
the other needs, must be recognized at law. This equalitarianism
is basic to humanitarianism and contrasts sharply with the
objective moral hierarchy of traditional Catholic ethics.45 At first
blush, wrongful life tort appears to rely on an ontological oddity,
but the ethical and metaphysical substructure of humani-
tarianism 46 makes it readily intelligible. Ideas of human
sovereignty, egalitarianism, and suffering as a basic evil, when
linked, make for the contemporary mind a potent brew.
The wrongful life tort sits at the very place these three ideas
meet. In liberal regimes, abortion is the homicide of an innocent
on the private authority of the mother. A mother is the equal of
the state in having lethal authority. If abortion enters into the
definition of wrongful life tort, it is significant that it does so
formally as a suicide, and more specifically, an assisted suicide.
Like abortion, suicide is wrong, says Aquinas, because it is the
killing of an innocent on private authority, and in this case, on
the authority of the person to be killed.47 The idea that a person
ought to have the authority to say what he is willing and able to
suffer has common appeal. 48  Wrongful life tort is quite
43 See AUREL KOLNAI, The Sovereignty of the Object, in ETHICS, VALUE, AND
REALITY: SELECTED PAPERS OF AUREL KOLNAI 23-43 (1978).
44 Kolnai, supra note 29, at 435.
45 I would argue that Charles Curran is a humanitarian theorist and not a
moral theologian. He writes, "[v]eritatis splendor explicitly uses scripture to support
the notion of intrinsic evil proposed by the contemporary hierarchical magisterium
in its arguments against proportionalism and consequentialism." CHARLES E.
CURRAN, THE MORAL THEOLOGY OF POPE JOHN PAUL II 53 (2005) (emphasis added).
46 Kolnai, supra note 29, at 443.
47 See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 5, at 14
(1st ed., Benziger Brothers, Inc. 1947) (1266-1273) ("One who exercises public
authority may lawfully put to death an evildoer, since he can pass judgment on him.
But no man is judge of himself.").
'48 An opponent of suicide, Kant acknowledged that the argument from suffering
was a powerful one. See KANT, supra note 34, at 43. Schopenhauer agreed, but he too
thought suicide a morally confused response to suffering. See RAYMOND B. MARCIN,
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compelling once the formality of assisted suicide is granted; the
tort's ontological strangeness all but vanishes if its true ethical
and metaphysical tissue is clearly appreciated. Consequently, it
is at the level of the ethical and metaphysical substructure of
humanitarianism that Catholic ethics must make its argument.
For a culture so deeply influenced by humanitarianism, least
persuasive of Aquinas' arguments against suicide is perhaps his
claim that suicide denies the sovereignty of God. Yet it is this
argument that is central to Evangelium Vitae. As a constellation
of abortion, eugenics, 49 and suicide, wrongful life tort certainly
has all the marks of a paragon of the culture of death. It is a
great embarrassment to Catholicism, therefore, when the tort
finds its major premise in scripture. Strangely though, it is from
this embarrassing similarity between scripture and humani-
tarianism that the glimmer of an argument against wrongful life
tort emerges. Reflecting on the comment of Jesus about Judas-
"It would be better for that man if he had never been born"50-
medieval theologians speculated that the condition of the
damned in hell certainly justifies willing non-existence over
existence. 51 Not only does theology concede a crucial premise of
the tort, de Vitoria's explanation for the intelligibility of the
premise is a quality of life argument. 52 Like Aquinas, he argues
that the damned can rightly will not to exist.53  Thomas'
argument is exceptionally short and from the authority of
scripture 54  ("Preferable is death to a bitter life ... ."5).
IN SEARCH OF SCHOPENHAUER'S CAT 106, 108 (2006).
49 Eugenics is positively embraced by some commentators. See Kelly E.
Rhinehart, The Debate over Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life, 26 LAW & PSYCHOL.
REV. 141, 143 (2002) (stating the importance to society of reducing genetic defects);
cf. Hackett, supra note 2, at 265 ("The argument proceeds by claiming that
restricting wrongful life and wrongful birth acts effectively licenses physicians to
withhold eugenic information from the parents, thus inhibiting the fundamental
interest of procreative choice protected by the Constitution.").
50 Mark 14:21 (New American); cf. Job 3:11 ("Why did I not perish at birth, come
forth from the womb and expire?").
51 Cf. JOURNET, supra note 41, at 202 (noting that Kierkegaard's philosophy
puts forth the idea that dignity lies in the fact that humans cannot choose
nonexistence).
52 See DE VITORIA, supra note 34, at 103 (stating that suicide may be lawful
when a man chooses not to prolong his life).
53 Cf. id. at 171 (noting that for those men who deserve to die, it is lawful for
them to ask to be killed).
5 Thomas, IV Sent., d. 50, qu. 2, a. 1, qc. 3. The references to Ecclesiastics here
are, in the modern Bible, parts of Sirach. Aquinas also cites Revelation to John 9:6
and Sirach 41:3.
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Therefore, a biblical theology clearly cannot accept that all
human life is sacred. 56 If this admission scrambles certain
bedrock assumptions about the way Christians are supposed to
conceive of life, what is the significance for humanitarianism that
the tort relies upon a secularization of the idea of the damned? Is
humanitarian sentiment a sufficient guide for culture if
humanitarian pity resurfaces damnation? Can such incoherence
be a tolerable guide for jurisprudence? For is it not odd that
medieval moral theology and humanitarian pity both agree that
a suffering life well warrants the desire that one should never
have existed at all?
Apparently, Peter Singer once said that only two people
really understand what is at issue in the world today: John Paul
II and Peter Singer!5 7 Unsure about when he said this and in
what context, I have always assumed that what he meant was
that with him and John Paul II, humanitarianism and
Christianity squared off against one another. Are these two
value systems really so different though? Nietzsche, of course,
saw little difference, thinking of one as parent and the other
offspring.58 Scheler accepted Nietzsche's analysis of humani-
tarianism as ressentiment, but argued forcibly that Nietzsche was
utterly mistaken that Christianity had anything in common with
humanitarianism. 59 Though it agrees with Christianity about
the idea of the damned, humanitarianism offers a very different
meaning of damnation. The Christian idea of damnation is a
55 Sirach 30:17.
56
And in the case before us, although not to exist is as such bad, still as a
means of avoiding afflictions it can not only be thought to be good, but can
actually be good. And although to exist is good in itself, nevertheless, when
it is linked with some evil it can not only be thought to be, but actually can
become evil.
DE VITORIA, supra note 34, at 91.
57 See Richard John Neuhaus, A Curious Encounter with a Philosopher from
Nowhere, 120 FIRST THINGS 77, 78 (2002) (noting that Singer has stated that "he
and the Pope are the only ones who understand what the abortion debate is about").
5s See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE ANTI-CHRIST (1895), reprinted in THE ANTI-
CHRIST, ECCE HOMO, TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS, AND OTHER WRITINGS 66 (Aaron
Ridley & Judith Norman eds., Judith Norman trans., 2005) ("The 'humanitarian'
blessings of Christianity! To breed a self-contradiction out of humanitas, an art of
self-violation, a will to lie at any cost, a disgust, a hatred of all good and honest
instincts!").
59 See SCHELER, supra note 24, at 95 ("The profound inner difference between
the facts and concepts of Christian and those of humanitarian love seems to have
escaped Nietzsche completely.").
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punishment suffered: a retribution for unjust acts. Instead,
humanitarianism offers homicide as a solution for suffering.
Why this turn to homicide? What exactly is it about the mixture
of human sovereignty, egalitarianism, and suffering that
generates the culture of death? The thinkers of the Munich
school agree that there is some deep connection. Readers of
Evangelium Vitae are typically amazed and thoroughly disturbed
by John Paul II's claim that contemporary democracies are both
totalitarian and tyrannical.60 Even pro-life conservative readers
think John Paul II is something of a hot-head at this point. Why
readers should be so aghast is unclear. Singer has long held that
Western liberal democracy is a tyranny, 61 and yet he does not
seem to provoke the same angry bewilderment. Elsewhere I have
shown the plausibility of John Paul II's claim, but the claim was
made before him, albeit a little more provisionally, by Kolnai. No
one questions that Kolnai was one of the most astute observers of
politics, yet he too saw a logical movement in humanitarianism
to "new phenomena of tyranny."62  In humanitarianism he
observed "signs of shifting towards a totalitarian or 'identitarian'
loss of liberty and personality"63 and claimed that "[1]ife that has
become 'its own master' is bound for suicide."64 Yet why should
this be so? What about humanitarianism links it interiorly to
killing? Singer is the foremost humanitarian philosopher writing
today. It seems reasonable to test the Munich school's thesis
against his work. Can one find in it an "ideological immoralism"
(Kolnai)? I will show that Singer's egalitarianism underlies his
ready recourse to homicide as a solution to problems of human
welfare.
Traditionally understood, a tort requires that the defendant
has a duty to the party bringing suit. How can a duty exist in
this case? The right correlative to duty in this case is the right
not to have to suffer 5-and so a legal right not to be born6 6-
whilst in wrongful birth, the right is to choose an abortion
60 EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 18, 20.
61 See SINGER, supra note 15, at 185.
62 Kolnai, supra note 29, at 430.
63 Id. at 443.
64 Id. at 454.
65 See Hackett, supra note 2, at 252.
66 See id. at 252 n.22 (listing cases that deal with the question of whether to
recognize a legal right not to be born).
2006] 659
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secured by Roe.67 Until 1946, courts did not recognize a doctor's
duty to an unborn child. By 1971, every American jurisdiction
recognized such a duty.68  By 1983, this duty, argued the
Supreme Court of Washington, "may extend to persons not yet
born or conceived at the time of a negligent act or omission."69 Of
course, this ontologically expansive duty had already been
trumped in 1973 by the duty owed first to the mother's choice
whether to abort the child or not. Still, assuming certain
conditions, the tort asserts a doctor has the duty to end the
known future life of suffering of an unborn child. Peter Singer's
work on homicide readily supplies this duty. The fourth chapter
of Singer's book Practical Ethics has for its title "What's Wrong
with Killing?"70  It is now a locus classicus for thinking about
homicide. Singer wants to change our basic laws on homicide
and especially those that protect innocent children: he wants the
law to enable parents and medical officials to kill children. 71 This
is putting the matter starkly, but truthfully, and Singer would
not object to putting matters thus. The problem is, however, are
there answers to his arguments?
Like Thomas' natural law theory, Singer's theory of homicide
does not rely on rights.72  Because Singer is a leftist,73
egalitarianism is basic to his thinking:74 this egalitarianism is at
the service of the essential goal of leftism, which according to
Singer, is to reduce "the vast quantity of pain and suffering."75 A
universal perspective in ethics-which is essential to morality,
we are told-is to acknowledge that "my own interests cannot,
67 Granchi, supra note 5, at 1269.
68 Rhinehart, supra note 49, at 149.
69 Id. at 154.
70 See SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 83.
71 See id. at 169-70.
72 Important Thomists like Maritain and Finnis argue that there is a theory of
natural right or human rights in Aquinas. See John Finnis, Natural Law: The
Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 24-25 (Jules Coleman et al. eds., 2004). I agree with
Thomists like McIntyre, who deny this is true. As an example, Aquinas' theory of
homicide nowhere mentions such things nor conceptually relies upon them, and nor
does one find in the tradition of Catholic moral theory such reliance. See SINGER,
EXPANDING CIRCLE, supra note 42, at 110-11; SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra
note 40, at 89.
73 PETER SINGER, A DARWINIAN LEFT: POLITICS, EVOLUTION AND COOPERATION
9 (1999) [hereinafter SINGER, A DARWINIAN LEFT].
74 Id.
75 Id. at 8.
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simply because they are my interests, count more than the
interests of anyone else."76  This assumption requires
examination because it is clearly driven not by any ordinary
ethical consciousness but by a political ideology. Singer is simply
wrong when he says that "[w]e cannot, if we are to think
ethically, refuse to take this step."77 Those of us interested in
liberty and escaping the grip of totalitarian thinking certainly
can refuse this first step. Without it, the power of Singer's
arguments diminishes rapidly. Nowhere does this thinker,
famous for questioning received opinion and tradition, address
why one should accept that equality is basic to ethical
orientation. What is known as the "order of charity"-an idea
shared across centuries by authors as diverse as Aristotle, 78
Vitoria, 79 Smith,80 and Spencer,81 to name a few-not only rejects
this assumption, but accords far better with our basic intuitions
and behaviour. The order of charity holds that family is a matter
of privilege and the source of ethical inequality. Let me give an
example that shows that Singer's claim that privileging some
people's interests over those of some others is not moral is
unconvincing. I live in a city with an awful public school system.
Parents that can, by and large, do send their children to private
schools. They seek privilege for their children. However, there is
a cadre of parents committed to the local, neighbourhood school.
These parents are wealthy and liberal in their politics. Now, the
neighbourhood school is not all that bad-it is regarded as the
city's one decent school and it even has an elite division within it
where most of the white, liberal parents have their children.
But, here's the interesting thing-none of these parents
volunteer their children to enter any other school in the entire
city. If they are so egalitarian, why not send their children, in
solidarity, to one of the exclusively black schools in the city?
Parents do not do this because it is deeply unnatural to reject
76 SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 12 (emphasis added); see
SINGER, EXPANDING CIRCLE, supra note 42, at 100-01, 106.
77 SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 14.
78 See NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 11, at 1097a24-b6.
79 See DE VITORIA, supra note 34, at 199.
80 See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 219-22 (Knud
Haakonssen ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1759) (discussing the qualities of
superior reason and sacrifice and their ethical value).
81 See HERBERT SPENCER, THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS vol. I, 54-55 (Liberty
Fund, Inc. 1978) (1897) (arguing that ethics is based upon the evolution of conduct).
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preferment for one's child.82 It is unnatural to reject privilege,
and this is felt by those parents who love to read Singer! Singer,
even when it comes to contemporary America and its deepest
veins of liberal culture, seems to be simply wrong that a
consensus has been reached that equal consideration of interests
is basic to ethical judgment. Singer does acknowledge that
biology imposes this preferment, but he denies it any moral
standing. 83 Singer accepts that there is a human nature, 84 but it
is irrelevant to ethics on account of the naturalistic fallacy.85 He
recognizes that the "natural affection" of parents for their
children 86 is a basic feature of human nature and, therefore, a
restraint upon reform. As part of the reform school of
utilitarianism, 87 Singer, nevertheless, accepts Burke's caution
that reform must be judicious in acknowledging limits;8 8 for
Singer, those established by sociobiology.89 Still, ordinary moral
consciousness, expressed in the ius gentium, for example, is
thoroughly rejected as a guide to moral right and wrong90 and
merely tolerated as a sign of what the reformer might be best to
leave alone. I take my example to show that only someone with
the most ideologically attenuated grasp of ordinary moral
consciousness could agree with Singer. All the evidence of
ordinary moral consciousness says that Singer's equality
intuition-"an interest is an interest, whoever's interest it may
be"91 or "each life is of equal value"92 -is no intuition at all.
82 The well-known one-time Marxist, Gerry Cohen, openly acknowledges this,
and interestingly, on the matter of school choice. See G.A. COHEN, IF YOU'RE AN
EGALITARIAN, How COME YOU'RE SO RICH? 179 (2000).
83 SINGER, A DARWINIAN LEFT, supra note 73, at 61.
84 SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 43-44.
85 See SINGER, supra note 15, at 5 (noting the fallacy of the principle of equality
since it would have to be expanded to all living beings); SINGER, EXPANDING CIRCLE,
supra note 42, at 53, 73-75 (1981) (noting the error in moving from facts to values
regarding the value of human survival).
86 SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 182; accord SINGER,
EXPANDING CIRCLE, supra note 42, at 31-34 (discussing the disparity between
resources expended on a parent's child and charity).
87 See SINGER, supra note 15, at 5 (discussing Jeremy Bentham, the founder of
the reform school of utilitarianism).
88 See SINGER, EXPANDING CIRCLE, supra note 42, at 151, 154-55 (noting
societal reform "grow[s] out of long practical experience").
89 See id. at 27, 157 (noting that the core of ethics has a biological basis).
90 See SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 93-94 (stating that
departures from intuitive moral principles may produce the best outcomes).
91 Id. at 21; accord SINGER, supra note 15, at 5.
92 SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 105.
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Sensing this himself, Singer falls back on elitism, assuring us
that his position is at one with "the leading figures in
contemporary moral philosophy."9 3
Scorning intuitionism as relying on "a mysterious realm of
objective ethical facts,"' 94 he nevertheless, without argument,
asks us to accept that "[e]quality is a basic ethical principle,"95 a
"moral idea."96 That is a basic ethical intuition. Singer's reliance
on intuitionism is really quite extensive. He thinks, for example,
that it is self-evident that any social order which provokes a
sense of superiority, a feeling of hopeless inferiority or a divided
society97 stands forthwith morally condemned. Singer explicitly
says, if inconsistently, biological theories of human nature cannot
provide "the ultimate premises of ethics" but they can operate
negatively to make us "think again about moral intuitions which
we take to be self-evident moral truths."98 How exactly biology
makes us possibly rethink moral intuition is unclear, especially
as Singer is adamant that no factual knowledge can ever dislodge
the core conviction of utilitarianism that suffering is an intrinsic
evil. 99 He tells us that the "ultimate moral reason for relieving
pain is simply the undesirability of pain as such."100 Thus, "[i]f a
being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to
take that suffering into consideration."'01  This is the only
exceptionless moral norm, 10 2 and it is crucial because from it
moral interests are derived. Interests are immediately tied to
"[t]he capacity for suffering and enjoyment."'1 3  Singer denies
that his ethics is a naturalism or an intuitionism. His
93 SINGER, supra note 15, at 5.
94 SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 8; accord SINGER, EXPANDING
CIRCLE, supra note 42, at 107.
95 SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 21.
96 SINGER, supra note 15, at 4.
97 See SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 40, 44 (noting that
inequalities create a divided society when the inequalities coincide with obvious
differences between ethnic or racial groups).
98 SINGER, EXPANDING CIRCLE, supra note 42, at 84.
99 Id. at 64.
100 SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 21; see also SINGER, supra note
15, at 20-21.
101 SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 57; see also SINGER, supra note
15, at 7-8.
102 See SINGER, EXPANDING CIRCLE, supra note 42, at 108-09, 165 (denying the
validity of "conventional moral rules").
103 SINGER, supra note 15, at 7; see also SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note
40, at 57.
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exceptionless norm appears to be both at once. Whether Singer
is coherent at this point is not decisive. 10 4 He could pick either
and find himself in the company of moral theologians who are
either intuitionists (Scheler) or naturalists (Hittinger).
Nevertheless, since for Singer pain is an intrinsic moral evil,
might there not be others, such as to kill the innocent? If it is
true that the experience of pleasure is "intrinsically
valuable"' 05-and it is worth noting that at least one intuitionist
(Von Hildebrand) has denied this' 06 -then perhaps to safeguard
innocent human life, even if that life does not experience
pleasure or pain, is "intrinsically valuable?" For Singer,
innocence cannot be an original value, and concepts essential to
jurisprudence like guilt and innocence are derived from what
does and does not create suffering. Singer is certainly adamant
that innocence is not a matter of helplessness, poverty,
brokenness, or vulnerability since we are told explicitly to "put
aside feelings based on the small, helpless ... infants."'0 7 Since
innocence is not a primitive value, the direct killing of the
innocent cannot be an intrinsic evil. I now want to argue that
the dismissal of the doctrine of intrinsic evils is decisive against
Singer. Intrinsic evils diversify the moral world, discriminate
amongst actions, and simultaneously limit action and conserve
eccentricity. What is decisive against Singer then is not the
peculiarity of his naturalistic intuitionism but his
identitarianism which exposes the totalitarian logic of his
humanitarianism.
Whilst leftists and rightists have had ready recourse to
totalitarian government in the past, I take it that today a thinker
shown to be a totalitarian thinker is a failed thinker, although I
now state a limit to my argument. Every historical instance of
totalitarianism has been homicidal. Camus argued that what he
called the Age of Rebellion, the history of the West since the
104 Singer would reject the option of being either a naturalist or an intuitionist
and insist, I imagine, on being a rationalist. At this point Singer is like Finnis, who
also insists he is neither naturalist nor intuitionist. I find both Singer and Finnis
completely unconvincing on this point.
105 SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 121; see generally SINGER,
EXPANDING CIRCLE, supra note 42, at 64 (explaining the utilitarian belief of
happiness).
106 See AUREL KONAI, The Concept of Hierarcy, in ETHICS, VALUE, AND REALITY,
supra note 44, at 180.
107 SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 170.
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Middle Ages, was homicidal and therefore its own refutation. 08
Disturbingly, it is obvious to every reader of Singer that he
envisages an increase in the number of killings of humans as part
of a social project overall to reduce the number of killings of
sentient creatures. And yet clearly the homicidal character of
the theory is not a refutation for many readers. I will show that
Singer's theory is totalitarian; but to close the argument, I have
to hope that refutation is found in the reader's sense that
Singer's work is a formal recommendation for an increase in the
number of killings of humans and also a decrease in human
liberty. If a reader accepts that a just cost for reductions in the
amount of suffering is an increase in homicides and a loss of
liberty, my argument fails.
Famously, Thomas Aquinas does not rely on a rights-based
theory of political order, but a law-based conception. Rights are
nowhere mentioned in his question on homicide. The discussion
about who can be killed, by whom, and when, is conducted
entirely free of rights talk. How can this be plausible? How does
Aquinas build restraint into law itself'? Strangely, but not
paradoxically, he does so in part by insisting upon the privilege of
public authority.109 In restricting to government the authority to
kill intentionally, Aquinas affirms an Augustinian tradition of
politics. In dividing the city into two, oftentimes hostile, cities,
Augustine immediately separated Christianity from any political
logic of identitarianism. 10 The term belongs to Aurel Kolnai:
identitarianism, for him, is the metaphysical heart of
totalitarianism." 1  Insisting upon the privilege of public
authority to intentional homicide, Aquinas rejects a private use
of lethal force-he even rejects intentional killing in self-
defence-and thereby an identitarianism that would abolish
political pluralism. Identitarianism finds a place inside
humanitarianism because an animating principle of
humanitarianism is its hatred of privilege. Self-consciously
108 See ALBERT CAMUs, RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH 163 (Justin
O'Brien trans., 1988) (discussing Western society's attributes as a totalitarian
society).
109 See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 47, at 1467-68.
110 See AUGUSTINE THROUGH THE AGES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 199-200 (Allan D.
Fitzgerald ed., 1999) (describing Augustine's "city of God" and "earthly city").
111 AUREL KOLNAI, Privilege and Liberty, in PRIVILEGE AND LIBERTY AND OTHER
ESSAYS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 19-61 (1999).
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humanitarian, 112 Singer's work is eloquent on this point. One of
Singer's most famous egalitarian claims is that non-human
animals have a moral claim upon us prior to some humans. 113
Resistance to this claim is blamed on "the deep-seated Western
belief in the uniqueness and special privileges of our species. '114
As Kolnai noted sixty years ago, the destruction of privilege is
also the advocacy of equalitarianism and therewith the
conceptual heart of totalitarianism, identitarianism."15 The close
connection between these ideas is everywhere in Singer's work.
It is no surprise at all that Singer wonders at the fact that
the idea "that human life has unique value ... and is enshrined
in our law."116 Singer's equalitarianism must be hostile to
whatever is unique 17 or what has "special status,"118 lest it break
free of being placed inside an equation. 1 9 Discussing a court
case about medical treatment given to a handicapped child, he
notes that the "treatment cost $104,000, at 1977 cost levels-
today it could easily be three times that."' 20  This
commodification of human life is an essential aspect of Singer's
work; he explains that every life is monetary, that is, explainable
in units that can be set in a calculus about worth.' 2 ' For Singer,
these units establish the sameness of every life. Singer points
out that "Christianity brought into the Roman world the idea of
the uniqueness of the human species."' 22 In his assessments of
the kinds of human life, Singer asks repeatedly whether all the
humans in a particular calculus are "normal" humans. 123 This
fascination with normality is a fascination with identity, the root
of totalitarian thinking. Singer's utilitarianism, and most
112 See generally SINGER, supra note 15, at 220-21.
113 See SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 76-77.
114 Id. at 89.
115 See generally EXPLORING THE WORLD OF HUMAN PRACTICE: READINGS IN
AND ABOUT THE PHILOSOPHY OF AUREL KOLNAI 179-80 (Zoltan Balazs & Francis
Dunlap eds., 2004) (discussing Kolnai's theory of "privilege").
116 SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 84.
117 See SINGER, supra note 15, at 198.
1's See SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 77.
119 See SINGER, supra note 15, at 8.
120 SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 84.
121 'Worth" as used here, of course, does not mean worth in the original sense of
dignity. For a discussion of this original sense, see Aurel Kolnai, Dignity, 51 PHIL.
251, 251-71 (1976).
122 SINGER, supra note 15, at 191.
123 qp q1Nr..P PRACTCAL ETHICS, s ... . A0 a" 75, '1'0 " "V 182; ......
supra note 15, at 16, 19-21.
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especially his attack upon the privilege of speciesism, 124
absolutely requires identity, for otherwise no calculus about
worth can be made. "Killing them [defectives], therefore, cannot
be equated with killing normal human beings."125  Singer's
normal human beings have the "morally relevant characteristics,
like rationality, self-consciousness, awareness, autonomy,
pleasure and pain,"1 26 and without these characteristics a human
being is best thought of as "an existence that is of no 'intrinsic'
value at all.1 27 Singer confirms Scheler's claim that no culture
has advocated the direct killing of those who exhibit
personality.128 According to Singer, "if human life does have
special value ... it has it in so far as most human beings are
persons."1 29 Here, however, it is well to recall Kolnai's claim that
modern humanitarian love shows "signs of shifting towards a
totalitarian or 'identitarian' loss of liberty and personality."'
30
Identitarianism robs the eccentric of personhood and so makes
the stranger a fit object of homicide. Furthermore, Singer's
fascination with the normal is also an appeal to an
identitarianism that destroys liberty. For, like innocence,
personality is not basic and controlling. This implication is
obvious given his universal moral rule. He defines his preference
utilitarianism when he writes: "an action contrary to the
preference of any being is, unless this preference is out weighed
by contrary preferences, wrong. Killing a person who prefers to
continue living is therefore wrong, other things being equal."13'
When Singer writes "other things being equal," he bespeaks his
position that, given that there is no absolute prohibition on the
direct killing of persons and no mention in this definition
whatsoever of innocence as a protection against being killed,
determining the morality of killing a person is a matter of
124 See SINGER, supra note 15, at 19 (discussing Singer's theory of how one
would avoid speciesism).
125 SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 182 (emphasis added).
126 Id. at 151.
127 Id.
128 See MAX SCHELER, FORMALISM IN ETHICS AND NON-FORMAL ETHICS OF
VALUES 313 (Manfred S. Frings & Roger L. Funk trans., 1973) (stating "the sacrifice
of the being and life of a man for any utilitarian needs or for the sake of convenience
was always proscribed by every ethos").
129 SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 117.
130 Kolnai, supra note 29, at 443.
131 SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 94.
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assessing what threat to happiness is posed by suffering. 132
Thus, the problem with newborn defectives is that they are "a
threat to the happiness of the parents."'133 Singer argues that "if
we are preference utilitarians[,] we must allow that a desire to go
on living can be outweighed by other desires."' 34 So, a preference
utilitarian takes seriously the wish of someone about to be
euthanized who does not want to be killed "as an important
reason against killing" but not a final reason. 135 Being a person,
innocent and free, is not a definitive restraint on killing if a
killing can reduce suffering. Unlike Thomas's philosophy of law,
people are not killed because of crime but on account of tort.
They are killed because their lives harm others whose lives
would be more pleasurable without them.
Equalitarianism thus drives Singer's theory of killing. The
eccentric or strange resists collapse into a unit of exchange. The
stranger is an exemplar of privilege, shielded by the doctrine of
intrinsic evils which generates an inequality and priority
amongst moral objects. Singer refuses to tolerate the moral
selection proposed by this doctrine, and so we look in vain to him
for justice for the disabled. Singer's theory of homicide is all of a
piece with his commitment to Progressive Democracy, 136 Kolnai's
term for humanitarianism with a dialectical relationship to
communism. Singer is a statist with a fondness for the Greek
law of homicide. 37  This is no surprise. Greek law did not
recognize the legal existence of private associations. 138 Corporate
existence was unknown, and there was then nothing like the
medieval commenda which diversified the social sphere and
limited political power. 139  Private association is always the
establishment of certain privileges for some but not all, just as
every human life is an eccentricity negating identity. Singer's
egalitarianism compels him to deny the sovereignty of the object,
132 See id. at 182-83.
133 Id. at 183.
134 Id. at 99.
135 Id. at 194.
136 See SINGER, EXPANDING CIRCLE, supra note 42, at 119 (sketching out
Singer's view of the dialectical progression from the humanitarian perspective of
equality to the ideal of the brotherhood of humanity).
137 See SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 88-89 (discussing Singer's
view of Greek law concerning homicide).
138 EDWARD E. COHEN, ANCIENT ATHENIAN MARITIME COURTS 120 (1972).
139 Id.
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the felt primacy of a field of moral prohibitions evident in
ordinary moral consciousness, and therewith God, in favour of
the sovereignty of needs that must have no restraint or order
placed upon them. Not even the traditional jurisprudential
categories of innocence and guilt should prejudice us to which
needs are to be fulfilled. The only legitimate order is that
required by the imperative to decrease suffering. Homicide can
be a means, a most effective means, to realizing that imperative.
Wrongful life tort is an illustration of humanitarian love: the
appetite to resolve "the conflict between. . . the sanctity of
human life, and the goal of reducing suffering 140 by application
to homicide.
140 SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, supra note 40, at 182.
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